State-building in Iraq since 2003: the Challenges and Lessons. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 12/2014 by Alshinawi, Arsalan
 An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region
Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 02/2013
 
With the support of the Life Long Learning Programme of the European Union
 
Migration in the Central 
Mediterranean
by Roderick Pace 
 
An evolving EU engaging a changing Mediterranean region
Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 
 
 
 
State-building in Iraq si
the Challenges and Lessons
 
 
by  Arsalan Alshinawi (
 
 
 
12/2014 
nce 2003: 
Department of International Relations, University of Malta
 
1 
 
 
 
 
) 
 Copyright © 2014, Arsalan Alshinawi                                                                                                
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form o
means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise 
European Studies, University of Malta. 
 
Publisher: Institute for European Studies, Msida, Malta.
 
The Institute for European Studies 
 
The Institute for European Studies is a multi
in European Studies which fully conform to the Bologna guidelines, including an evening diploma, Bachelor degrees, a Mast
Ph.D. The Institute also operates a number of Erasmus agreements for staff and student exchanges.  Founded in 199
Documentation and Research Centre (EDRC) it acquired the status of a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in 2004. The In
also developed links with various research networks such as the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), LISBOAN, 
two Euro-Mediterranean networks EUROMESCO (the Euro
Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences
 
The research interests of its staff include comparative politics and history of the European Union (EU); EU institutions; EU 
relations and enlargement; small states in the EU; Malta in the EU; Euro
Economic Governance of the Euro Area; Europe 2020; EU development policies and Climate Change.
 
Contact Details 
 
Jean Monnet Chair website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies/jmceu
Institut for European Studies website: http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies
Tel: +356 2340 2001 / 2998 
Address: Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, Tal
 
Submission of Papers 
Papers are to be submitted to roderick.pace@um.edu.mt
bibliography. 
 
Citation 
Arsalan Alshinawi (2014). ‘State-building in Iraq si
Institute for European Studies (Malta). 
 
 
Chair: Prof Roderick Pace 
 
Prof Fulvio Attina 
Prof Stephen Calleya 
Dr Marcello Carammia 
Prof Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira 
Prof Aylin Güney 
Dr Mark Harwood 
Prof Magnús Árni Magnússon 
Dr Michelle Pace 
Dr Stelios Stavridis 
Dr Susanne Thede 
Prof Baldur Thorhallsson 
 
The Jean Monnet Occasional Papers do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for European Studies but those of the
This project has been funded with the support from the European 
and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
                             
– without any prior written permission from the Institute for 
 
-disciplinary teaching and research Institute of the University of Malta offering courses 
-Mediterranean Study Commission)  and FEMISE (
 Économiques) as well as the European Association of Development Institutes (EADI).
-Mediterranean Relations; Stability and Growth Pact; 
 
-med/ 
 
-Qroqq, Msida MSD2080, Malta. 
. They are not to exceed 6,000 words including footnotes and excluding the 
nce 2003: the Challenges and Lessons.’ Jean Monnet 
ADVISORY BOARD 
Professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam, 
Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Università di Catania, Italy
Director, Professor of International Relations, Mediterranean Academy of 
Diplomatic Studies, Malta  
Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta
Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, School of 
Social and Political Sciences, Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal
Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Department of International Relations, 
Yaşar University, Izmir, Turkey 
Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta
Associate Professor, Bifröst University, Iceland 
Reader in Politics and International Studies, Department of Political Science and 
International Studies (POLSIS), University of Birmingham
ARAID Researcher University of Zaragoza, Spain 
Senior Lecturer, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta
Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at the 
Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland
Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author, 
 
 
2 
ISSN 2307-3950 
r by any 
ers and 
1 as the European 
stitute has 
Forum 
 
external 
Occasional Papers, No.12, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 author. 
 
  
 
Baghdad-born Dr Arsalan Alshinawi is a full
International Relations of the University of Malta since 2009, after more than 13 years
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta including posting at the Maltese diplomatic
North Africa. He was a lecturer at the Faculty of Oriental Studies, and the
International Relations, in St Petersburg State University in Russia
visiting lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy
Malta and the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani. 
Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies in Beirut, and acts as supervisor and
graduate dissertation of the Master’s Prog
 
His most recent publication will feature in the forthcoming edition
History of the University of Malta, entitled ‘
external versus the internal.’ 
 
Dr Alshinawi studied Pharmacy and Diplomacy at the University of Malta, and International
Relations and International Political Economy at the Universities of Amsterdam and
the Netherlands. He is fluent in Maltese, Arabic, Kurdis
 
 
About the author 
-time resident academic at the Department
. Dr Alshinawi
He is also a Research
 
ramme in Diplomacy of the DiploFoundation. 
 of the Journal of Maltese 
The political economy of Malta: A review of the 
h and Persian languages.
 
 
0 
 of 
 at the 
 missions in 
 School of 
 is currently a 
 of the University of 
 Associate with the 
external examiner for 
 
 
 Nijmegen in 
 
      
 
About the author ................................
Introduction ................................
The Challenges of state-building in Iraq since 2003
1. The external division................................
2. The internal division ................................
3. The Constitution of Iraq
State-building in Iraq since 2003: the Lessons
Bibliography ................................
 
 
Table of Contents 
................................................................
................................................................................................
 ................................................................
................................................................
................................................................
 ................................................................................................
 ................................................................
................................................................................................
 
 
1
.................................. 0 
.......... 2 
........... 3 
................. 5 
................. 7 
............ 9 
.................. 12 
...... 14 
      
 
State-building in 
Iraq since 2003: 
the Challenges 
and Lessons
 
by Arsalan Alshinawi* 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2003, Iraq was invaded by the US
coalition forces that ousted Saddam 
Hussein’s regime from power before 
occupying the whole country. The intension, 
declared by the then American 
George W. Bush, was to ‘build a decent and 
democratic society at the centre of the 
Middle East’ that ‘will become a place of 
progress and peace.’1 In 2014, three years 
after the withdrawal of the last American 
soldier, however, it is difficult to 
overestimate or exaggerate what is at stake. 
National unity and territorial integrity have 
never been so seriously threatened since the 
country is experiencing the
internal fighting in its modern history. Many 
parts of Iraq, including the northern oil
city of Kirkuk, long claimed as an integral 
part of the semi-autonomous region of 
Kurdistan, are out of the control of the 
central government. Large areas in the north 
including the strategic city of Mosul were 
seized by the fighters of the Islamic State, an 
Al-Qaeda offshoot, formerly known as ISIS, 
who threatened to invade the Kurdistan 
region before being attacked by airstrikes by 
the US. They proclaimed a caliphate on both 
                                                
*Lecturer at the Department of International 
Relations, Faculty of Arts, University of 
Malta. 
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 Record, Jeffrey (2010) p.110 
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sides of the border with Syria, where they 
also control vast territory.
The regime change after the military 
invasion was one of the major pillars of US 
foreign policy, which see
states as the biggest threats to world 
stability.2 However, the country remained 
crippled with armed insurgency and inter
communal clashes, with deep divisions and 
widespread dysfunction in government 
institutions, military and police fo
Terrible bloodletting became endemic with 
violent attacks escalating this year which 
began in almost the same way as the past 
year, which saw the highest death toll since 
2006-2007. Ending eight years of 
tumultuous rule, Prime Minister Nouri Al
Maliki has recently relinquished power 
while the solution to the governance and 
peaceful settlement of the country remains 
unclear. 
The scale of humanitarian emergencies, 
particularly in Baghdad and other cities, 
caused by the war featured predominately in 
most news media in every form.
Nexis search of New York Times coverage 
in one-year slices (March to March) showed 
1,848 articles concerning Iraq in 2006
and 1,350 in 2007-08.
debates among politicians and diplomats, 
largely under the scrutiny of the media, but 
much less academic examination, so that the 
public’s view remained mostly shaped by 
media constructs and representations. For in 
the West, there were several media 
interpretations, trivialisation and 
dramatisation of events. Sch
tend to focus on replacing authoritarianism 
with a more democratic system as a 
technical process. On the crisis in Iraq, as 
literature reviews on state building show, 
there is a dearth of case
                                        
2
 Boot, Max (2005) p. 93. 
3
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offer detailed contextual analysis of the 
critical underlying events and conditions, 
with adequate attention being given to the 
relationships between phenomenon and 
context without clear boundaries.
 
The writer concerned himself with the 
inherent links between the dramatic change
unleashed in 2003 in the internal socio
political context in Iraq, with the lack of 
reconciliation and stability, which 
intensified after the adoption of the Iraqi 
constitution in 2005. This paper focusing on 
the US-sponsored state-building in Iraq, 
seeks to make a contribution to the scholarly 
and public understanding of the key 
interconnecting variables that run through 
much of the ‘rich’ tapestry of the obstacles 
facing the remaking of the national Iraqi 
constitution, in real-life situations. The aim 
is to shed more light on the 
conventional/received wisdom and 
contemporary political analyses in Iraq 
itself. Relevant information was drawn from 
the personal experience and observations of 
the writer, from direct contact and 
engagement with the people in I
summer 2013 in a field study that sought to 
capture in more detail local perceptions and 
insights. The publications cited include 
available magazines, newspapers, journal 
articles and monographs as well as 
government documents. 
 
The Challenges of state-building in Iraq 
since 2003  
 
When the US took control of Iraq in 2003, it 
became directly responsible for governing 
25 million people, for providing security and 
infrastructure, and stabilising state and 
society.5  The aim was to depose tyranny 
and dictatorship and turn post
into a beacon of secular liberalism which 
would be held up as an example for its 
authoritarian neighbours. This would help to 
spread democracy in the troubled Middle 
                                                
4
 Scott, Zoe (2007).  
5
 Hippler, Jochen (2005).pp.81-
4
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East and bring accord between Israel and the 
Palestinians.6 After all it was a long
principle of liberalism that democracies 
were less likely to go to war. 
 
A stable Iraq, in the middle between Turkey, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, not far from Israel, 
all of them regional powers with conflicting 
interests and positions in international 
relations, holds notable importance, not only 
in a region like the Middle East, but far 
beyond, for international politics and the 
world economy. Iraq has access to the 
Persian or Arabian G
energy-rich and strategic waterways for 
global oil transportation and the world 
economy, with the world’s fourth
proven oil reserves, and may prove 
according to many estimates to possess huge 
still undiscovered deposits, the larges
extractable in the entire region.
 
The US embarked on laying the foundations 
of democratic governance, and preparing for 
some kind of Iraqi self
systematic and effective ways to stop social 
fragmentation that could not be achieved 
without functioning state structures and 
mechanisms.8 Activities and initiatives 
tailored towards reconstructing the state, 
implemented between 2003 and 2007, were 
considered crucial by the US Army and 
administration as many, both inside the 
academic world and beyond, saw the 
establishment of order, the overcoming of 
deep divisions, the consolidation of 
democracy, and the emergence of well
functioning economies, as impossible goals 
without a strong, effective state.
neoliberal state-building paradigm
had emerged during the 1990s: advocating 
democracy and market-economic reforms as 
                                        
6
 Record, Jeffrey (2010). p.
7
 Luft, Gal (2003). 
8
 Record, (2010) p.110. 
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essential means of rehabilitating public 
authority.10   
 
However, the military operations, 
comprehensive stabilisation, wholesale 
transformation, and as Ward noted, the
of the US to organise a ‘replacement 
regime,’ which required solid commitment 
to provide massive political, military and 
financial resources over  a long stretch of 
time, all turned into extremely difficult tasks 
to achieve.11 There were huge losses o
American and Iraqi sides, in life and 
property, which forced the complete 
withdrawal of the US troops by December 
2011, in spite of the enormous investment 
what has become the biggest relief and 
construction operation in American history
of a magnitude not undertaken since the 
time of Germany and Japan just after the 
second world war.  
 
The US experience with democratisation or 
democracy building after Saddam,
the starkest evidence of the many challenges 
facing the realisation of sustaina
governance. The US, as Katz pointed out in 
a commentary for the Middle East Policy 
Council, was unable to halt the massive 
violence, looting and infrastructure 
breakdown, and had little success in 
persuading or cajoling important Iraqi 
groups to fully, or even just less than fully, 
cooperate with one another to form a stable 
government.12  
 
The Americans could not bring about 
agreement between different communities, 
factions, and parties on the writing of the 
constitution as a fundamental act of politica
reconstruction, which is considered the most 
appropriate legal instrument to establish 
political compromise between various 
entities, groups and individuals within the 
state. What became exceedingly problematic 
                                                
10
 For a summary and critique, see Paris, Roland 
(2004).  
11
 Ward, Celeste J. (2005) and
(2010)  
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 Ibid. Katz, Mark N. (2010), op.cit.
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was state-rebuilding, increasingly accepted
as the most critical in post
through external action
studies single out operational limitations and 
unintended, but undesirable, consequences 
of international aid, and others focus on 
institutional lacunae).14
application and method have all been 
questioned,15 together with the extent to 
which it served to bring order and peace, or 
on the contrary induced upheavals and 
disorder, deepened anti
Western) sentiment in the region, and 
harmed the Arab-Israeli negotiations.
 
The articulation and outcome of the US 
mission of state-building in a country like 
Iraq, arguably a watershed that could for 
some years to come set research agendas on 
a number of subjects in International 
Relations, with implications f
practice, needs to be surveyed and 
interpreted in a ‘unique case orientation’ 
where each case is treated as special and 
unique. 
 
This analysis adopts a holistic viewpoint to 
the whole phenomenon under study which is 
understood as a complex system, more than 
the sum of its parts. However, it attempts to 
capture the details of the individual case 
being studied. It seeks to go beyond s
dynamics, in order to highlight in some 
meaningful way a linear cause
relationship between decisive, case
variables. The focus is on the links between 
                                        
13
 See, for example, Fukuyama, Francis (2004)
and Paris, Roland (2004). 
14
 Samuels, Kirsti (2006).  
15
 See publications by the Iraq Institute for 
Strategic Studies (mostly in Arabic). 
http://www.iraqstudies.com/
16
 There is the view that suicide attacks (a 
particularly effective form of terrorism) are 
driven by the strategic objective of forcing the 
US and other countries to pull out 
forces from the territory regarded in historical 
and cultural-religious terms as the homeland. It 
implicates the US (and Western) foreign policy 
in the causes of the terrorist attacks across 
borders. Pape, Robert (2005)
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foreign intervention, change in the internal 
socio-political context, and interrela
external and internal divisions undermining 
the remaking of the national constitution. 
 
1. The external division 
 
The authority to mount the military 
operations in Iraq was claimed by the US 
and British governments under United 
Nations Security Council
(UNSCR) 1441, the last in a long line of 
resolutions calling for Iraqi disarmament. 
Veto-wielding members of the Security 
Council like France, Russia and China 
refused to give support for a second UNSCR 
explicitly authorising the use of ‘all 
necessary means.’ For Operation “Iraqi 
Freedom” and for much of the war in Iraq, 
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF
referred to as the coalition forces, could only 
draw military contingents from EU countries 
like Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Poland, in addition to the UK. With no 
second UN resolution forthcoming, along 
with the overt objection of France and 
Germany (who found themselves in an 
unlikely alliance with Russia against the 
war), unity was lacking in the EU. Belgium, 
Greece, Luxembourg, and some other 
neutral EU member states were on the 
Franco-German side, while the UK, Spain, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Denmark supported military action. This led 
to a crisis in the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and a rift between the U
and France and Germany, which was 
criticised by the Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld as representing the ‘Old 
Europe’ in comparison to the ‘New Europe,’ 
the latter being the countries that were 
compliant with the US.17 
 
Since the invasion of Iraq the
persistent differences between the EU and 
the US. When sanctions, a major tool of the 
US foreign economic policy had been 
applied, EU member states had already 
differed with Washington and this became 
                                                
17
 Spyer, Jonathan (2007) pp.93
ted, 
 
 
 Resolution 
–I), often 
S, 
re have been 
 
-95. 
deeper with disagreement on the extent of 
the threat posed by Iraq, and the appropriate 
response to it.18 The EU member states were 
unable to reach a consensus, which turned 
into a direct challenge to their organised, 
agreed foreign policy, diplomacy and 
actions, under the aegis of the 
Foreign Security Policy (
crisis, as Spyer pointed out, ‘exposed the 
dilemmas and paradoxes at the heart of 
European attempts to build a common 
foreign and security policy.’
 
For the territorial defence of Europe and 
peace-making, the CFSP reli
though since 1999 the EU has increasingly 
been  taking responsibility for implementing 
missions of peace-keeping’ and policing of 
peace agreements (Kosovo, Georgia, Atlanta 
off the Coast of Somalia etc). There is a 
relationship between the EU f
NATO, which is often described as 
‘separable, but not separate.’
some of the major powers of the EU showed 
little attachment to the US’s policy of using 
NATO for bringing democracy to the Arab 
states, thus moving from a policy of 
containment to one of regime change, which 
became particularly evident in 1998 with the 
passing of the Iraq Liberation Act, signed 
into law by President Bill Clinton, and 
which was later cited in October 2002 in 
support of the authorisation of military 
action against Iraq.21  
 
With many EU member states concerned 
about the military ambitions of the Iraqi 
regime and the possibility of its concealing 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from 
UN inspection, a UN Security Council 
resolution offering it ‘a final opportuni
comply with its disarmament obligations’ 
                                        
18Gordon, Philip H and Shapiro, Jeremy (2004)
19
 Spyer,  p. 93 
20
 Military Reform Project (2002)
21
 The Iraq Liberation Act was a 
the American Congress and 
President Clinton, setting up a programme to 
support the transition to democracy in Iraq which 
effectively meant regime change.
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(that had been set out in several previous 
resolutions) was adopted unanimously on 8 
November 2002. However, as has been 
noted, there was a European divergence on 
the use of force in Iraq as the UK committed 
troops, while France and Germany 
disapproved.22 French President Jacques 
Chirac criticised the countries of Central 
Europe and the Baltic states who were 
joining the EU and who had demonstrated 
their support for the Americans, when he 
accused them of missing
opportunity to keep silent.’23
 
With the post-Saddam government, the EU 
showed more interest in re
notably from June 2004, when a strategy 
paper envisaged inviting Iraq to join the 
EU's Strategic Partnership for the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, and 
recommended a concerted effort to have Iraq 
admitted to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and reinstate favoured trading 
partner relations with Baghdad. The EU 
announced its commitment, shared with the 
US, to support the Iraqi people and the fully 
sovereign Iraqi Interim Government to build 
a free, secure, democratic, unified and 
prosperous country, at peace with itself, its 
neighbours and with the wider world. The 
EU became involved in assistance for the 
delivery of basic public 
employment and poverty reduction and 
strengthening governance, civil society and 
human rights. The aim of the EU was to 
offer support for the rule of law and civilian 
administration, and to use its relations with 
regional neighbours to encourage 
engagement and support the political 
settlement and economic improvement of 
Iraq. The EU played a positive role in 
negotiations on Iraq’s external debt and on 
trade issues. It also enhanced its 
representation in Iraq.24 
 
                                                
22
 Lemaitre, Philippe (2003). 
23
 Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose (2003) 
24
 Council of the European Union (2004)
US Declaration of support for the people of Iraq. 
p.2. 
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, EU-
The American intervention h
into the first Arab-majority country to be 
ruled by Shia followers since 1171 when 
Salahiddin overthrew the Fatimids in 
Egypt.25 Following this, t
between the regional powers, in particular 
the historical rivalry between Saudi Ara
and Iran, became very evident
that, in the words of
veteran Iraqi journalist, since 2003 Iraq had 
become an ‘arena for the Saudi
of-war.’26  
 
In the conflict in Iraq, Arab Sunni Muslims 
and Arab Shia Muslims are supported by 
Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively
Saudi Arabia are longstanding regional 
rivals, whose heavy involvement in this 
particular conflict is a reenactment of what 
they do in many other parts of the Muslim 
world.27  The Shia Muslims are a minority in 
the Muslim world but they can exercise a lot 
of influence.28 With Iraq and its vast oil 
resources and huge Shia population, Iran 
sought to forge a larger Shia alliance, 
essential for its strategic aims in the region. 
Inside Iraq, as Nasrawi pointed out in 2013, 
Saudi Arabia, through close connections to 
Sunni tribes and Sunni religious leaders, and 
its ‘traditional cheque
opposed Iran’s hegemonic aspirations when 
these threatened its national interest, and its 
                                        
25
 According to most sources, including the 
CIA's World Factbook, the majority of Iraqis are 
Shia Arab Muslims (around 65%), and Sunnis 
represent about 32% of the population.
26
 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/
11/iraq-saudi-arabia-between
20131128638344586.html 
27
 See the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies 
publications (mostly in Arabic). 
http://www.iraqstudies.com/
28
 Though estimates vary considerably, there are 
around one and a half billion Muslims in the 
world, and between 10 and 20 per cent are Shia, 
minorities in a Sunni homeland in most 
countries, but in majority in Iraq, Bahrain and 
Azerbaijan, in addition to Iran.
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historical self-proclaimed position as the 
leader of the Arab Muslims.29
 
Iraq, like in many of the major political 
shifts in the Middle East after the fall of 
Saddam, as Wehrey et al noted, came under 
the heavy impact of the often tense 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
conditioned by the different sects that the 
majority populations in both countries 
follow.30 The sectarian hostilities increased 
as leading and influential clerics in both 
countries deemed each other’s religious 
beliefs as incorrect while
governments remained in strong 
antagonism, leading to deep-
in the wider security, economic, energy, and 
geopolitical issues. The Islamic Revolution 
in Iran, and its  declared anti
regards Saudi Arabia as an agent of the 
serving  US interests, while 
has always looked very sceptically at  Shia 
Iran’s religious and political strategy in the 
Persian (or Arabian) Gulf, and its intentions 
of greater influence in the region and in the 
entire Muslim world.31 
 
2. The internal division
 
In Iraq, contrary to the US government’s 
plans and predictions, the Americans were 
regarded as occupiers, not liberators, and 
that is one of the major reasons why the war 
was not over quickly. Since 2003, the 
country saw some of the worst
rebellion and clashes between different 
groups on territory, rights, the sharing of 
political-power and oil revenue, which 
overshadowed the loss of life as a direct 
result of the allied military actions. T
was what many called an Iraqi civil war
                                                
29http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/201
3/11/iraq-saudi-arabia-between-
20131128638344586.html 
30
 Wehrey, Frederic (2009). 
31
 The Saudi King told Hervé Mo
Defense Minister of France, according to Le 
Figaro, on 5 June 2010, that there are ‘two 
countries in the world that do not deserve to 
exist: Iran and Israel.’ 
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security situation that could be described as 
disastrous, for it led to the curtailment of 
production, its foremost source of income,
hindered urgently-needed rebuilding and 
recovery, and terribly lowered living 
standards for most of the popula
 
Since 2003, Iraq has become one of the 
world's ‘top’ unstable states in 
Index, produced by 
magazine and the Fund for Peace. Between 
March 2003 and June 2006,
deaths were reported by
Iraq Family Health Survey. The UN High 
Commission for Refugees has estimated that 
nearly two million Iraqis have fled the 
country since 2003, mostly to Syria and 
Jordan. The Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre estimates an additional 
1.9 million are currently displaced within 
the country.34 Iraq’s vital oil industry,
more than a decade of sanctions and two 
Gulf Wars, became considerably 
by the insufficiency of infrastructure, and 
lack of skilled labour, investment and 
modernisation.35 Iraq is in need of billions of 
dollars to fix field development and 
exports.36 
 
In Iraq, after the US intervention, which 
empowered Arab Shia and sidelined Arab 
Sunni, the ethnic and sectarian rifts 
deepened, with grave consequences. While 
the Kurds in the north, relatively prosperous 
and stable, appear closer than ever to 
breaking away, the Sunni are in a vicious 
insurrection, fighting to regain old 
dominance. As Vali Nasr, the author of 
Shia Revival explains, the main threat to the 
political power, livelihood and sense of 
                                        
32
 Crude oil export revenues accounted for
two-thirds of GDP in 2009 (
Information and Analysis Unit, UN, 
Reports). 
33
 Dodge, Toby (2013). 
34
 The figures available on different types of 
casualties vary, with information on both 
military and civilian loss of life not always 
precise and consistent. 
35
 Donovan, Thomas W (20
36
 Skibiak, Nicholas (2010)
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security of the Shia in Iraq is the ‘war with 
their Sunni countrymen.’37 The real problem 
in Iraq, as the deputy speaker of parliament 
pointed out, is that the ‘Sunni do not accept 
power in the hands of the Shia.’
 
After the external intervention that turned 
the internal balance of power in favour of 
the often brutalised Shia majority and the 
Kurds, the Shia led government remained 
deeply troubled by the Sunni insurgency 
struggling to end the policy of 
marginalization, while at the same time 
Sunni rebel groups became more determined 
to eliminate Shia rule. With Shia leaders 
unable to share power in a stable way that 
satisfies the Sunni community, 
against Shia dominance was strong. Shia 
holy sites and Shia neighbourhoods in 
Baghdad and other cities were attacked by 
Sunni rebels, who first embattled foreign 
troops but later, with the involvement of 
Qaida, began targeting ordinary Shia
civilians, thousands of whom have been 
abducted and murdered.39 The Shia, notably 
after the bombing of their shrines and 
mosques by the Sunni, fought back in a 
cycle of violence that became overtly 
sectarian, in which Al-Qaida
significant role with deadly suicide 
bombings of Shia targets. Extremists from 
both sides fought each other, with hundreds 
of suicide bombs in streets, markets, 
hospitals, offices, weddings and funerals.
 
The replacement of the Sunni dominated 
government by a predom
government led to a situation in which 
clerics assumed leading roles and functions.
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Shia banners and posters of religious Shia 
figures decorate the government fortified 
block-houses in the Green Zone and much 
of the rest of Baghdad, toget
checkpoints, prisons and police stations, 
where the sectarian allegiance is on display. 
Thus the Shia began showing much higher 
levels of religious and sectarian 
identification, representation and 
institutionalisation, after long periods of 
systematic discrimination by the minority 
Sunni, who for centuries ran the country.
Historically, Iraq, where Arab 
up roughly 20 percent of a population of 26 
million, had been ruled by Sunni groups, 
who came mainly from geographically 
specific areas, since attaining independence 
in the 1950s. The top posts in the 
government and security services, and 
army’s corps commanders were mostly 
occupied by Sunni members of Saddam’s 
Baath Party that ruled with an iron fist since 
the 1960s. The bulk of the Shia
relatively more depressed region of the 
country in the south, experienced a tragic 
history in which their aspirations were 
systematically suppressed.
intervention changed all that.
 
The Sunni bitterly opposed the government 
led by Nouri al-Maliki, the secretary
of Al-Dawa, a Shia Islamic Party, who 
became the Prime Minister following the 
period of the Transitional Government, 
before stepping down in August 2014. They 
accused the Shia government of 
disregarding agreements 
in a nominally fair way, adding that this was 
in effect preventing reconciliation and 
causing paralyses in the political process. 
They strongly resisted the high 
concentration of authority in the hands of 
the Shia. This concentration of power
Shia hands cannot be denied when all the 
important positions such as those of acting 
Interior Minister, acting Defence Minister, 
and acting National Security Minister were 
all  held by Al-Maliki in his second Cabinet 
since December 2010. Maliki’s first
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was approved by the National Assembly and 
sworn in in May 2006. 
 
Most Sunni, as Ali Abel Sadah, a Baghdad 
based writer for both Iraqi and Arab media, 
pointed out in 2013, feel threatened with 
sectarian cleansing, deeply concerned about 
the future of the Sunni under a Shia 
government, loyal to Shia Iran. They 
attribute the political and economic 
alienation at the hands of the Shia 
government to Iran’s hegemonic strategy 
across the region, which is firmly on the side 
of Shia groups.  They believe tha
devastating sectarian conflict is the result of 
Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of 
Iraq, which has to be liberated from what 
they regard as the ‘Iranian occupation.’ 
Troubled by their sect’s uneasy situation in 
Iraq, and implicating Iran, Saudi rulers and 
religious leaders have criticised Iran, while 
they (the Saudis) and the Gulf States have 
poured in funds for Sunni rebels.
 
Before the overthrow of Saddam, the Sunni 
ruled in all the countries of the region, and 
the Shia never governed a modern Arab 
state: they were only in control of Persian 
Iran. After Saddam’s demise, the Shia 
acquired an Arab Shia titleholder in Iraq, at 
the core of rising Arab Shia power, which 
widened the schism that runs like a tectonic 
fault-line along what is known as the Shia 
Crescent, stretching from Lebanon through 
Syria and Iraq to the Gulf and to Iran and 
further east.43 
 
The fault-line became more exposed with 
the wave of anti-government protests in 
2011, commonly referred to as the ‘Arab 
Spring,’ and the large-scale civil unrest. 
Though not entirely religious in their 
composition, the uprisings aggravated the 
Sunni-Shia divide, posed serious threats to 
the existing regional political order, and 
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alarmed both Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 
sectarian clashes in many
by poverty, inequality, and struggle for a 
larger share of power, and privileged access 
to government, wealth or religious authority, 
the Sunni-Shia rivalry has turned from a 
‘regional cold war’44 into a truly hot war.
 
3. The Constitution 
In Iraq, after 2003, the revision of the legal 
codes, reforms of the judiciary, police, penal 
system and laws to govern the new 
democracy required a new constitution, a 
high-stakes sensitive exercise in which the 
future rights and interests of all 
society, that are often in conflict, are 
implicated.45 It became urgent for political 
and governance transition, sustainable 
peace-making, security and order, all 
fundamental for the rebuilding of public 
institutions.46 In countries such as Iraq, a
successful outcome of a constitution making 
process is not only dependent on the final 
document, but on the path to producing and 
adopting it, which if properly organised and 
given adequate attention and resources could 
become transformational for society
according to what was concluded in a 2003 
study by the US Institute of Peace on 
constitution making, peace building, and 
national reconciliation.47
A glance at Iraq’s constitutional history also 
offers some insights into the challenges 
which constitution writing involves. Iraq’s 
first constitution, the fundamental law of the 
country, which established a constitutional 
monarchy, entered into force under the 
auspices of the British military occupation in 
1925 and remained in effect until 1958, 
when a republic was established after the 14 
July Revolution – also known as the 
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Iraqi coup d'état – that overthrew the 
Hashemite kingdom.  
Interim constitutions were adopted in 1958, 
1963, 1964, 1968, and 1970, the last 
remaining in effect until the time of the 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), 
drafted between December 2003 and March 
2004 by the Iraqi Governing Council, an 
appointed body selected by the US
Coalition Provisional Authority as the 
transitional government after the invasion of 
Iraq.48 
In a referendum in October 2005, the 
permanent constitution, drafted by members 
of the Iraqi Constitution Drafting 
Committee, was approved, before the first 
government of Iraq led by Al
office on May 2006. This Constitution 
superseded the TAL.49 The pur
‘bring settlement and stability’ since Iraqis 
need to ‘come together to build a new 
nation,’ pointed out Hajim al
National Assembly’s speaker.
 
However, the outcome of the country
referendum went contrary to what the Sunni 
Arabs wanted, who had hoped for the 
insertion of a veto provision designed to 
protect minorities. Hence they actively 
rallied two-thirds of the voters in three 
provinces to vote against it. A two
rejection vote in three of the country's 18 
provinces (of which three are thought to 
include Sunni majorities) would have 
required the dissolution of the Assembly, 
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never promulgated in the turbulent years that 
followed the outbreak of the Gulf War.
49
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fresh elections, and the recommencement of 
the entire drafting process. 
 
The possibility of veto by the majorities of 
three or more governorates 
written into the interim constitution to 
ensure that the permanent constitution 
would be acceptable to the Kurdish 
minority. However, the constitution was the 
least acceptable among the Sunni, whose 
veto would have resulted in the 
constitution's rejection. Of the 18 provinces, 
two recorded ‘No’ votes greater than two 
thirds, but one province fell short of a veto. 
In other words there was rejection by solid 
majorities in three Sunni
but the two-thirds threshold was only 
reached in two provinces.
 
Sunni negotiators refused to accept the 
constitutional deal, after months of 
painstaking negotiations and weeks of 
deadlock, despite warnings from the Shia 
and Kurds of the danger of greater sectarian 
clashes if the process encoun
delays. As representatives of Sunni Arabs, 
Shia Arabs and Kurds failed to find 
solutions agreeable to all of the three major 
groups, the writing, approval and 
amendments of the constitution became a 
major bone of contention. The majority of 
Sunni Arabs, suspicious of the intentions 
and actions of the Shia and Kurds, voted 
against the constitution, or stayed away to 
signal disapproval of the document and the 
process by which it was drafted. The task of 
preparing a draft constitution had been gi
to Constitutional Committee, appointed by 
the Transitional National Assembly. It was 
obligatory, according to the TAL, for the 
Constitutional Committee to complete its 
work by 15 August 2005, and for the draft to 
be submitted to national vote by 15 Oct
2005.52  Reports from Baghdad confirmed 
                                        
51
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
dyn/content/article/2005/10/25/AR20051025003
57.html 
52
 See the Iraq Institute for 
publications (mostly in Arabic). 
http://www.iraqstudies.com/
 
10 
 
was originally 
-majority provinces, 
51
  
tered further 
ven 
ober 
         
-
Strategic Studies 
 
      
 
that consensus was elusive and the first 
deadline to submit a draft copy to the 
transitional national assembly was missed.
 
The Sunni complained that the document, 
drafted in haste by Shia and Kurds, was 
completed under pressure from the US. 
Most negotiating parties were aware that 
they were still far from any final agreement 
on some of the constitution's most important 
prescriptions when the Committee was 
effectively dissolved and replaced
hoc body (referred to as the Leadership 
Council) of no more than 6 members who 
continued to negotiate the constitution's final 
terms until three days before the referendum 
date. They protested that they were 
marginalised during the draft
that their objections had been ignored by the 
ruling Shia and Kurdish coalition 
determined to force an agreement and 
prevent any logistical challenges and delays 
that would have prolonged the preparatory 
stage and the referendum.  
 
Only 3 of the 15 Sunni members of the 
drafting committee attended the signing 
ceremony, and none of them signed it. Shia 
leaders were accused by the Sunni of giving 
no concessions to bring them on board, 
which was, they argued, evident in the 
statements of the chairman of th
committee. The chief Sunni negotiator was 
reported to have urged his followers to vote 
against it, because the situation was not 
balanced and the compromise they sought in 
negotiations had not materialised. The office 
of Shia Prime Minister was 
confirmed that the document would be put 
to the voters, even without the approval of 
the Sunni.54 
 
The constitution, a blueprint for a new state, 
was submitted to parliament without the 
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support of Sunni leaders, who argued that it 
was drafted by the US, not by the Iraqi 
people, and questioned the legitimacy of a 
document supposed to unite the country not 
to risk greater bloodshed. The charter was 
rejected by the 15 Sunnis on the 71
constitution committee, and last
concessions did not win over most Sunni, or 
allay their fears. Sunni leaders, in a joint 
statement urged the UN, the Arab League 
and international organisations to intervene. 
The signing ceremony was shunned by the 
vice-president, a Sunni, citing illness. 
Enraged Sunni leaders and politicians were 
accused of inciting violence against the 
Shia, and of using abusive language riddled 
with anger when addressing the angry Sunni 
population. Thousands of protesters, 
chanting for the unity of Iraq, including 
some who carried pictures of Saddam, were 
mobilised by Sunni tribal leaders and 
religious scholars' associations.
 
In the remaking of the constitution, the main 
contentious issues were the status of many 
former affiliates of Saddam’s (largely 
Sunni) Baath party that had ru
1960s, and the question of regional 
autonomy. The Sunni leaders (some are ex 
Ba'athists and Saddam sympathisers) 
disputed what has become known as de
Ba’athification, enforced by the Shia in 
power, in the state, government, 
administration, army and police, against 
members and collaborators of the Ba’ath 
party. They squarely opposed federalism. 
 
One of the main Sunni resentments 
regarding the wording of the new 
constitution, concerned 
seeking to ostracise of all those who 
served in the government of Saddam, failing 
to guarantee their rights and undermining 
national unity by enshrining federalism. 
They preferred instead a constitution that 
would lead to a strong and centralised state, 
preferably Sunni-led, while the Shia
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Kurds are firmly in favour of de
governance with more regional autonomy. 
The Sunnis, located mostly in resource
areas in the west and centre of the country, 
regard the division of power between the 
federal government and regional 
governorates as no more than a plot to seize 
more regional autonomy and divert bigger 
shares of oil revenues to Shia and Kurdish 
areas, where the largest oil reserves 
predominantly lie.  
 
The Sunni fear that the handing over of 
additional power to provinces do
Kurds in the north and Shia in the south can 
only severely diminish their rights and 
fortunes, leaving them marginalised and 
poor in a country divided into semi
autonomous regions, while allowing Iran to 
exert more influence over the Shia south 
the Shia government in Baghdad.
 
State-building in Iraq since 2003: the 
Lessons 
 
More than a decade after the US
intervention, Iraq has become neither more 
secure nor more democratic. Iraq, since the 
collapse of Saddam’s regime, has become 
enveloped in ferocious sectarian strife, a 
cycle of Sunni–Shia revenge killing,
the US was unable to prevent or stop. 
Thousands of soldiers and civilians were 
killed by gunfire and suicide bombs.
2013 alone, over 1,000 Iraqis lost their life, 
over 3,200 in the first half of 2014, 
according to the UN.56 This year, after the 
offence by the Islamic state, the risk of more 
sectarian bloodshed is higher, 
of the eventual breakup of the country 
appears stronger, and the future remains 
uncertain. The costs of long
reconstruction of Iraq, according to reports 
by various US government agencies, 
multilateral institutions and other 
international organisations, could reach 
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noted by Toby Dodge, on the role of the US 
in Iraq, had become too tragic, befuddling 
and complicated.58 
 
This paper sought to shed more light on the 
challenges of bringing about change in Iraq, 
by means of exogenous force, outside the 
state, the opposite of endogenous, something 
generated or originated from within the 
state. It reviewed the links between foreign 
intervention, change in the internal socio
political context, and interrelated, external 
and internal divisions undermining the 
remaking of the national constitution, which 
exposes more than a decade of failed US 
policy, and brings to question the validity of 
exogenous action.  
 
Since the US invasion, the severe social, 
political and economic fragmentation of the 
country have intensified with  the rise of 
multiplicity of forces with different 
concerns, needs and demands, while at the 
same time  religious and doctri
between Muslim communities increased. 
The sectarian split between Sunni and Shia 
has become wider, creating a generation of 
enemies, mostly in terms of sectarian 
identity, association and action, which is 
destabilising the state and society a
human and material costs. In Iraq, since 
2003, the major stumbling block for return 
to peace and stability, and which is capable 
of plunging the country into more turmoil, 
and back into civil war, is the Sunni
conflict, which constitutes the m
challenge for constitutional remaking and 
state-building.  
 
The Shia, after holding power in Baghdad, 
alienated Sunni leaders, resisting calls to 
bring the Sunni minority into government. 
The Sunni, feeling marginalised, are 
fighting, even at the cost 
most radical groups, calling themselves 
Islamic or Islamist, who are applying 
extreme violence. The Shia, supported by 
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Iran, in cold war with the US, are at war 
with the Sunni who are supported by the 
Saudis and the Gulf States, and wh
ruled them mercilessly. In creating 
instability in Iraq, all neighbouring and 
bordering countries, notably Saudi Arabia 
and Iran are involved, each on one side or 
the other across the historical sectarian 
divide in the Muslim world. 
 
The war in Iraq against terrorism and WMD 
empowered, for the first time in centuries, 
the Shia, the majority Arabs, and 
disempowered the Sunni, the minority Arabs 
in that country. The military intervention 
changed the balance of power between the 
Shia and Sunni in Iraq, and beyond. It 
brought Shia to the helm of an Arab country, 
Iraq, for the first time, since the early days 
of Islam. It altered the fundamental socio
economic and political order in a country 
like Iraq, highly heterogeneous, with many 
ethnic, religious, sectarian and linguistic 
divisions. The extremely complex, internal 
setting or context changed drastically, by 
external force, which derailed endogenous 
change, with many serious implications. 
 
The war in Iraq has profoundly changed the 
Middle East, although not in the ways that 
Washington had anticipated. Unlike what 
the US government thought, after it toppled 
Saddam Hussein in 2003, the regime change 
did not help to bring democracy to Iraq and 
then to the rest of the region. The American 
intervention that empowered the Shia in Iraq 
helped launch a broad Shia revival that upset 
the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle 
East for years to come.  
 
The case of Iraq shows that the US and the 
West failed to see that politics is more than 
the relationship between individuals and the 
state in a region like the Middle East, where 
people understand politics as the balance of 
power among different communiti
discovered that in Iraq, among the country’s 
o for long 
-
 
es. They 
major communities, the fall of Saddam was 
largely viewed as an opportunity to redress 
injustices in the distribution of power and 
wealth.   
 
The war in Iraq demonstrates that formal 
democratic procedures do not necessarily 
amount to democracy where national 
sovereignty, a non-negotiable prerequisite 
for stable governance, exists on paper only. 
The crisis in Iraq calls for attention to the 
underlying internal conditions, unique in 
each country or region, 
particular constellation of historical and 
geographical factors. The conflict 
underscores the strength and resilience of 
internal forces of continuity, which 
determine internal change. Iraq, seen as a 
particular case, shows the significance
endogenous change, which must be allowed 
while strongly nurtured towards a gradual 
move to more equitable economies and fair 
societies. It calls for a review in definitions 
of democracy and democratisation in the 
whole region, their significance outsid
West, and a reconsideration of the scope and 
direction of the foreign policy of the US in 
the international system.
 
The war in Iraq brought lessons to Britain, a 
powerful member of the EU, widely 
criticized in Europe for strongly supporting 
much of the foreign policy of George W. 
Bush, with British armed forces on the 
ground in 2001 in Afghanistan and, more 
controversially, in Iraq in 2003. For the UK, 
in dealing with Iran, war appears off the 
agenda for the time being, as the British 
government has made it clear it backs the 
EU strategy of engaging rather than the US 
policy of isolating states that Western 
powers consider a threat to world stability.
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